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CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF CHILDREN
Because a large portion of the United States' population is
under twenty-one years of age, the law governing the capacity of
this group to be held responsible for their acts is necessarily of
great importance. To allow such a large group to be completely
immune from responsibility could undermine the entire basis of
the law. On the other hand, to impose adult standards on a group
that possess neither the maturity nor the judgment to make adult
decisions could result in great inequities. In an attempt to find
a middle ground between total immunity and total responsibili-
ty, a large body of law has developed. In view of the over-
whelming extent of this law, this paper will be confined to a
discussion of the contributory negligence of children.'
The subject involves three primary considerations: (1) the
existence of capacity for contributory negligence at any given
age; (2) assuming capacity has been established, the standard
of care that is to be applied; and (3) whether a child capable
of contributory negligence has complied with the particular
standard of care demanded by law.
Most jurisdictions have no problem with children three years
of age and younger, finding that, as a matter of law, they have
no capacity to be contributorily negligent. Similarly, infants
eighteen years old and over are uniformly found to have the
capacity to be contributorily negligent as a matter of law. At the
early stages of infancy the problem arises in trying to determine
when the child acquires capacity to be contributorily negligent;
whereas, at the latter stages of infancy, over fourteen, the prob-
lem becomes one of determining when the child has the adult
capacity to be contributorily negligent.
I. ILLuqOIS RuLE
Some jurisdictions, including South Carolina, in an attempt
to alleviate the problem of deciding when a child has the re-
quired capacity, have adopted the "Illinois Rule."2 In formulat-
ing their rule, the Illinois courts looked to the common law
capacity of an infant to commit a crime. "The common law rule
was that infants under the age of seven were conclusively pre-
1. See Annot., 107 A.L.R. 4 (1937), Annot., 174 A.L.R. 1080 (1948), and
Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 917 (1961).
2. This rule was adopted in Chicago City Ry. v. Tuohy, 196 Ill. 410, 63 N.E.
997 (1902).
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sumed incapable of crime; those between seven and fourteen
were rebuttably presumed incapable; and those fourteen or over
were presumptively capable."'3 Finding "age" to be the sole
determining factor of a child's criminal capacity, the courts de-
cided to make age the most important factor in the determina-
tion of a child's capacity to be contributorily negligent. As a
result, the following presumptions were formulated: a conclusive
presumption that a child under seven lacks the required capacity
to be contributorily negligent; a rebuttable presumption that a
child under fourteen lacks capacity; and a rebuttable presump-
tion that a child over fourteen has capacity to be contributorily
negligent.
A. Infants Aged One to Seven: Conclusive Presumption of
Incapacity
1. Development of Illinois Rule. The Illinois rule or the pre-
sumption of incapacity was first recognized in Chicago City
Ry. v. WileoW. 4 There a six year old child was waiting to cross
a street on which there were two cable tracks. He waited until
the train nearest him passed and then ran around the rear of
the last car to meet his mother who was waiting on the other
side. He was struck by a train coming from the opposite direc-
tion. The infant plaintiff was awarded the judgment, and the
defendant appealed in part on the ground that the instruction
that a six year old cannot be contributorily negligent was erro-
neous. In overruling the objection the court stated:
The only negligence charged was in not seeing, and thereby
avoiding, the train running north.... Doubtless a child
as young as the plaintiff was may possess to a very consid-
erable degree what may be termed the instinct of self-pres-
ervation, and be . . . capable of exercising care for his own
safety. But when moved by that instinct he acts only in
view of what he sees or what is actually present to his senses.
To guard against unseen danger or one ... not ... within
the sphere of his observation, requires an exercise of reason
3. 21 Am. Jtm. 2d Crimial Law § 27 (1965). But see 2 H1-AER & JAMES,
TORTS 926 § 16.8 (1956), which states:
Even if its counterpart has validity in the criminal law the existence of
any significant degree of correlation between the rates of development of
a child's sense of right and wrong on the one hand, and his perception
of danger and judgement of speeds and distances on the other, seems
questionable.
4. 138 Ill. 370, 27 N.E. 899 (1891).
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and reflection of which so young a child is seldom capable,
and for which the law, administered on human principles,
will scarcely hold him responsible. 5
Chicago City Ry. v. Tuohy0 also involved a six year old who
was struck by a train, but in this case the child was walking
backwards over the track talking to a friend on the curb. The
boy reached the far track and tried to cross back over the tracks
when he realized that the train was bearing down on him. There
was evidence that the trolley was speeding and had failed to
sound a warning gong. The plaintiff was awarded judgment,
and the defendant objected to the instruction that a child be-
tween five and six years old could not be guilty of contributory
negligence regardless of his lack of due care.
In Tuohy the court was faced with the same basic situation as
in Tfilcox7 except that in Wilcox the plaintiff was looking where
he was going, and in Tuohy he was not. However, the court in
Tuohy still found no error in the instruction and held that a
child under seven simply does not have the capacity to be con-
tributorily negligent regardless of how patent his carelessness
might be.8
The court in Tuohy ignored the statement in Wilcox that
"doubtless a child as young as the plaintiff was may possess to a
very considerable degree what may be termed the instinct of
self-preservation, and be . . . capable of exercising care for his
own safety."0 The court decided to solve the complex question
of when a child can be contributorily negligent by allowing one
factor-the age of the child-to control. Accordingly, the Illinois
rule is divided into three age groups: 0-6 years, 7-13 years, 14-21
years. As a matter of procedure under the rule, the court will
first ascertain the age and according to that age will apply the
appropriate conclusive or rebuttable presumption of incapacity
or if over fourteen the rebuttable presumption of capacity.
2. Concusive Presumption in South Carolina. The conclusive
presumption is a complete substitute for evidence, therefore,
after a court has adopted a conclusive presumption regarding a
factual issue, no amount of evidence can change that presump-
5. Id. at 374, 27 N.E. at 903.
6. 196 Ill. 410, 63 N.E. 997 (1902).
7. Chicago City Ry. v. Wilcox, 138 Ill. 370, 27 N.E. 899 (1891).
8. The adoption of the Illinois rule was unnecessary because the only ques-
tion was whether or not the instruction was prejudicial.
9. Chicago City Ry. v. Wilcox, 138 Ill. 370, 374, 27 N.E. 899, 903 (1891).
[Vol. 18
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tion. If it is established to the satisfaction of the court that a
child is under seven years of age, it will refuse to hear any evi-
dence concerning his contributory negligence.
The authority of the conclusive presumption in South Carolina
is weakened by the fact that the only case dealing with the
capacity of a child under seven to be contributorily negligent
cites as its authority cases involving children over seven and
discusses the incapacity of a child under seven to commit a
crime.' 0 The court engaged in no direct discussion as to the
child's capacity to be contributorily negligent.
The case which actually states the conclusive presumption
rule is Sexton v. Noll."
The rule of common law, that a child under seven years of
age is conclusively presumed incapable of committing crime,
has been adopted in this state as the test for determining
capacity to be guilty of contributory negligence.12
Tucker v. BuffaZo Mills'3 is cited as authority for this statement.
However, because Tucker dealt with a child over seven, the
court affirmatively stated that they would not rule on the law
regarding the capacity of children under seven.'4 From the above
discussion it can be seen that although the South Carolina courts
purport to follow the conclusive presumption rule and have
handed down a decision applying the rule,15 the authority on
which the rule is based is weak. Until the courts decide other
cases which involve children under seven, and which state the
presumption against a child's capacity to be contributorily negli-
gent, this weakness will remain.
The question of whether a child under seven is capable of
being contributorily negligent has never been realistically con-
sidered by the courts in South Carolina. Our courts have refused
to recognize any factor other than age as being material to the
question of capacity of children under seven to take care of
10. Dodd v. Spartanburg Ry., Gas & Elec. Co., 95 S.C. 9, 78 S.E. 525 (1913).
11. 108 S.C. 516, 95 S.E. 129 (1918).
12. Id. at 521, 95 S.E. at 130.
13. 76 S.C. 539, 57 S.E. 626 (1907).
14. We are not concerned in this appeal as to whether the Circuit Court com-
mitted error in so far as he charged that there was a conclusive presump-
tion of incapacity of a child under seven years to commit contributory
negligence. ... We are not to be regarded as making any ruling on that
particular point.
Id. at 543, 57 S.E. at 627.
15. Dodd v. Spartanburg Ry., Gas & Elec. Co., 95 S.C. 9, 78 S.E. 525 (1913).
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themselves. The simplicity of the danger and the obvious intelli-
gence and maturity of the child to avoid the danger are useless
arguments once the child has proved that he was under seven at
the time of the accident.
B. Age Seven to Fourteen: Rebuttable Presumption of
Itwapacity
The rebuttable or prima facie presumption against capacity
for contributory negligence causes a great deal of confusion in
regard to children aged seven to fourteen. The purpose or use-
fulness of the presumption is nebulous, and it is doubtful that
it accomplishes anything which the court could not accomplish
more effectively without the aid of any presumption.
The prima facie presumption of incapacity of a child to com-
mit a cme serves a useful function by placing the burden of
proof on the state to prove that a child has capacity to commit
a crime. The capacity to commit a crime must necessarily include,
to some extent, the capacity to understand crime. Most criminal
laws against crime prohibit an affirmative action that would
cause harm to a person or society, and public notice is given as
to what action would violate these rules. The presumption is that
a child of tender years does not understand the rules and that
any act violating the rules would be done innocently.
The capacity to be contributorily negligent does not require
the ability to understand any technical rules. The basic require-
ment is that a person must not put himself in a position that
will unnecessarily increase the likelihood of bodily harm. Be-
cause procedural ambits place the burden of proof on the de-
fendant to establish the infant plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence,' 6 capacity must necessarily be shown; therefore, the re-
buttable presumption does not appear to serve any useful
function.
The legality of the rebuttable or prima facie presumption was
raised in Tucker v. Buffalo Mills'T where the plaintiff was an
eight year old child. In charging the jury the trial judge stated
that there was a prima facie presumption that a child over seven
years of age does not have the capacity to be contributorily negli-
gent. The defendant asserted on appeal that the charge should
16. Butler v. Temples, 227 S.C. 496, 88 S.E.2d 586 (1955) ; Bolt v. Gibson,
225 S.C. 538, 83 S.E.2d 191 (1954); Crawford v. Charleston-Isle of Palms
Traction Co., 126 S.C. 447, 120 S.E. 381 (1923).
17. 76 S.C. 539, 57 S.E. 626 (1907).
[Vol. 18
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have been given to the jury as a factual issue unhampered by any
presumption.
The court in Tucker by negative reasoning approved the prima
facie presumption on the ground that there was no reason to
prohibit it. The Tucker court also referred to dictum in Watson
V. outhern Ry.18 which stated that in the absence of evidence
of an infant's capacity to be contributorily negligent there
is a prima facie presumption that he is incapable of negligently
endangering himself. The court admitted, however, that the
prima facie presumption was not essential to a determination of
whether the parents' negligence could be imputed to an infant.
The fact remains that the prima facie or rebuttable presump-
tion of incapacity of children seven to fourteen to be contribu-
torily negligent is the law in South Carolina.19 This presumption
can be rebutted by the defendant through a showing of the in-
fant's intelligence, maturity, experience, capacity, prior training
and formal education. If the defendant establishes that the child
did have the capacity to understand the danger involved, then
the child is compared to other children of his age, intelligence,
experience, maturity and with his capacity in order to determine
whether he acted as they would have acted under the same or
similar circumstances. 20 The standard against which the child's
action is measured is the reaction of other children with the
same qualities in a similar situation. What the mass of children
or the reasonable prudent child would have done under the cir-
cumstances is of no relevance. 21
It is important to distinguish between capacity and standard
of care.22 The reason for the distinction is to prevent the unwar-
ranted combination of two entirely different issues, for unless
capacity is established there can be no standard for the child
to meet.
18. 66 S.C. 47, 44 S.E. 375 (1903).
19. Hollman v. Atlantic Coast Line R., 201 S.C. 308, 22 S.E.2d 892 (1942);
Chitwood v. Chitwood, 159 S.C. 109, 156 S.E. 179 (1930).
20. The court stated that the test was "not whether the child acted as an
ordinary prudent child of its age would have acted but whether it acted as a
child its age and of its capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience would
ordinarily have acted under the same or similar circumstances." Chitwood v.
Chitwood, 159 S.C. 109, 113, 156 S.E. 179, 180 (1930).
21. Ibid.
22. Id. at 112, 156 S.E. at 180.
19661
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C. Infants Fourteen and Over: Presumption of Capacity
The capacity to be contributorily negligent has been compared
to capacity to commit a crime23 concerning children under seven
and children seven to fourteen. Therefore, it seems logical that
the analogy would also be applied to children fourteen and
over, presuming them to have the adult capacity to be contribu-
torily negligent. This could be rebutted by showing that the
required adult faculties to be aware of the danger were lacking.
In Chitwood V. Chitwood2 4 the contributory negligence of a
fifteen year old was in question. The court stated that there was
a presumption that children over fourteen had the capacity to
be contributorily negligent and that if the child had all the
requisite elements necessary to establish adult capacity, then he
could be held to the adult or reasonable man standard.2 5 The
dissenting opinion stated that the presumption was not merely
that the infant had capacity but that he had adult capacity,
and the burden of proof was on the child to prove that he did
not have adult capacity and should be judged by the lesser
standard.
26
If the common law analogy to criminal law is uniformly fol-
lowed, then the dissenting opinion of Chitwood is correct. But
this would create the harsh rule that a child thirteen years, three
hundred and sixty-four days old is prima facie presumed to be
incapable of "any" contributory negligence.27 However, the next
day he is presumed to have the adult capacity for self care. This
application would be an affirmative benefit to the defendant in
that it would allow him to defeat the plaintiff's case by proving
contributory negligence, however slight, and it would place the
burden of proof on the plaintiff to prove that he did not have
adult capacity to be contributorily negligent.
If the court merely states that there is a presumption of capac-
ity of children fourteen and over to be contributorily negligent,
many questions are left unanswered. It is apparent that this elim-
23. 21 Am. JuR. 2d Criminal Law § 27 (1965). But see Annot., 1917F
L.R.A. 10, 49, which stated that a child under seven is incapable of contributory
negligence, not because of any analogy to criminal law, but because a child
under seven lacks the discretion, judgment and appreciation of the probability
of danger.
24. 159 S.C. 109, 156 S.E. 179 (1930).
25. Id. at 114, 156 S.E. at 180.
26. Chitwood v. Chitvood, 159 S.C. 109, 158 S.E. 179 (1930).
27. The day before his fourteenth birthday a child is presumed not to have
the capacity to be contributorily negligent, but the next day he would be pre-
sumed to have the same capacity an adult has.
[VoL. 18
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inates the requirement that the defendant must establish the
capacity of the plaintiff. However, other issues are left unde-
cided. The -presumption does not state when the adult capacity
and adult standard of care are to be applied in a particular sit-
uation or whether the child should be compared to other chil-
dren of his age, intelligence, experience, maturity and capacity
until he reaches twenty-one. The answers are not as apparent as
the questions which are raised by the presumption.
Some of the modern decisions that apply the adult standard
to children draw a distinction between "children's activities" and
"adult activities." 28 Such adult activities would include the use
of vehicles or other instruments that are capable of inflicting
grave damage on other individuals or the public. A factor which
the courts feel has necessitated the imposition of an adult stand-
ard on children is the increasingly large number of automobile
accidents involving minors and the existence of the "childish
impulse" or a child's disregard for safety which is impossible
to anticipate while a minor is commanding a high powered
vehicle.
It could be argued that applying the adult standard to chil-
dren who enter adult activities leads to an illogical conclusion.
The purpose of the lesser standards of care for infants is to
allow for their immaturity and lack of discretion in foreseeing
a dangerous situation and taking steps to avoid the danger.29
However, to apply the adult standard to a child's adult activities
and a lesser standard to his childish activities would be to give
28. Harrelson v. Whitehead, 236 Ark. 325, 365 S.W.2d 868 (1963). The
court held that a fifteen year old boy riding a motorcycle on a public street was
subject to the adult standard of care for his own safety and that if the defendant
had known that the motorcycle was ridden by a minor he would still owe him
no higher degree of care than he would an adult. But see 38 Am. Jxu. Negli-
gence § 40 (1941); Dawson v. Hoffman, 43 Ill. App. 2d 17, 192 N.E.2d 695
(1963), held that minors are entitled to be judged by standards commensurate
with their age, experience and wisdom when engaged in activities appropriate
to their age, experience and wisdom, but stated that the court would not coun-
tenance the adoption of a double standard of care for drivers of motor vehicles.
In Betzhold v. Erickson, 35 Ill. App. 2d 203, 182 N.E2d 342 (1962), the court
held a thirteen year old unlicensed driver to the adult standard, and in Dellwo
v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 107 N.W.2d 859 (1961), a twelve year old driving
a motorboat was held to the adult standard.
29. The purpose of a distinct standard of care for children is to make allow-
ance for the child's immaturity in judging his contributory negligence.
If the Massachusetts standard is used, a child will be judged according
to his own intelligence, experience, and mental ability with respect to
capacity to perceive the risk. Once given this perception of the risk, the
child can be held to exercise the judgment of the standard child having
like qualities.
2 HA ER & JAmEs, TORTS 924 § 16.8 (1956).
1966] Nomes
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him protection for the simple dangers but to deny it for the
more complex ones.80 Theoretically, the only alternative for the
child would be to abstain from any adult activities until age
twenty-one and then be at the mercy of the adult world as an
inexperienced member of the family of the "reasonable man."
This segment of the law in South Carolina, as in many other
jurisdictions, is confusing, and it is conceivable that the scales
of justice will weigh in favor of the side which has the more
persuasive argument in each individual case.
IL. T~m MASSACnusrrs Ruim
The jurisdictions that reject the "presumption" method of
finding an infant's capacity to be contributorily negligent follow
a number of variations of the Massachusetts rule.3' This rule
rejects the idea that age is the major factor in determining a
child's capacity. Under the application of this rule each infant,
regardless of his age, is treated as an "individual.13 2 The capac-
ity of the child to be contributorily negligent is determined by
comparing his intelligence, experience and discretion with other
children of the same age, intelligence, capacity and experience,
acting under the same or similar circumstances.
A. Background
One of the earliest indications of adherence to the "Massa-
chusetts Rule" was by dictum in Collins v. South Boston H. R.
6o. 3 Here the court stated that "it is probable that the more
accurate statement of the law for children is . . . that a child
is to be held to the exercise of that degree of care which may
reasonably be expected of children his age .... "34 A later case
established that the issue of whether a child was capable of exer-
cising any care was a question for the jury.35 That "age" is not
the only factor to consider when establishing a child's capacity
to be negligent was set forth in Berdos v. Tremont & Suffolk
30. The conflicting interest would have to be resolved by public policy; how-
ever, very few cases distinguish the capacity requirements in applying them to
complex or simple dangers.
31. Annot., 107 A.L.R. 4, 44 (1937).
32. The individual child test is used in the Illinois rule for children seven to
fourteen and sometimes for children over fourteen once capacity is established,
but age is the controlling factor.
33. 142 Mass. 301, 7 N.E. 856 (1886).
34. Id. at 314, 7 N.E. at 859.
35. Sullivan v. Boston Elevated Ry., 192 Mass. 37, 78 N.E. 382 (1906).
[Vol. 18
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MNiU.86 The court indicated that there can be no dispositive rule
concerning the particular age at which a minor can be presumed
able to comprehend risks or capable of negligence.
B. Rejecting the Presumption View in, Favor of the
Massachusetts Rule
One of the most cited opinions indicating a preference for the
Illinois rule is that of Mr. Justice McAllister in Tyler v. Weed.87
He reasoned that seven was "the age of innocence" and the age
when a "human being passed from the realm of imagination and
dream to the world of reality and fact. s38 He further pointed out
that practical reasons for giving absolute protection to infants
under seven were that it would be administratively expedient,
it would avoid the danger of a shifting standard and it would
eliminate the confusion and inconsistency of jury decisions. This
reasoning was rejected by the majority of the court,89 and the
Massachusetts rule was adopted on the ground that jurors were
competent to judge whether a child had exercised a degree of
care commensurate with his age, capacity and understanding.
"A rule that age, not sense; years, not intelligence; length of
life, not experience, should govern responsibility for human ac-
tion is unsound and should be discarded."40
Other courts have rejected the Illinois rule on other grounds.
For example, in Johnson's Adm'r v. Rutland R. (0.41 the court
disapproved of the fact that the Illinois rule is based on the com-
parison of a child's capacity to be contributorily negligent with
his capacity to commit a crime. This court felt that the capacity
and discretion to understand the nature and illegality of a par-
ticular act which constitutes a crime and the capacity to care
for one's safety were essentially dissimilar. The court agreed that
the Illinois rule had the merit of simplicity but felt that it was
purely arbitrary and lacked the sanction of reason and expe-
rience.
42
36. 209 Mass. 489, 95 N.E. 876 (1911).
37. 285 Mich. 460, 280 N.W. 827 (1938) (dissenting opinion).
38. Id. at 474, 280 N.W. at 832.
39. However, in 1965 the majority accepted justice McAllister's viewpoint
in Baker v. Alt, 374 Mich. 492, 132 N.W2d 614 (1965).
40. Tyler v. Weed, 285 Mich. 460, 493, 280 N.W. 827, 840 (1938).
41. 93 Vt. 132, 106 Atl. 682 (1919).
42. Capacity to commit crime, involving, as it does discretion to understand
the nature and illegality of the particular act constituting the crime, is
one thing, and capacity to care for one's personal safety is another and
1966] NoT
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Another basis of the rejection of the Illinois rule has been its
"inflexibility." HelZtern v. Smekhwitz pointed out that a child
who is but one day under the age of seven years could be guilty
of the most flagrant act of contributory negligence, yet "his
exceptional precocity and breadth of judgment and experience
cannot be introduced to overcome the illusory presumption of
babylike puerility."44
Many jurisdictions have expressly rejected the "presumption"
method of finding an infant's capacity to be contributorily neg-
ligent and have adopted instead the more flexible Massachusetts
rule.4" The South Carolina courts have given no indication as
yet that any change from the presumption rule might be con-
sidered.
III. CONTMEIUTORY NEGLIGENCE TnzoRy BoimowED
A few jurisdictions apply the adult standard of care for a
child's negligence but a lesser standard for his contributory
negligence."6 The majority of jurisdictions, including South
Carolina, apply the lesser standard to both negligence and con-
tributory negligence.4
7
Illustrative of the extensions towards which applications of
the Illinois rule may be directed is Michigan, where the question
quite a different thing. . . . While the rule has the merit of simplicity, it
is purely arbitrary and lacks the sanction of reason and experience. . . .
The test of age is not sufficient. Much depends on the circumstances of
the particular case, especially the mental development and previous train-
ing and experience of the child.
Id. at 135, 106 Atl. at 685.
43. 17 N.J. Super. 366, 86 A.2d 265 (1952).
44. Id. at 377, 86 A.2d at 271.
45. Bush v. New Jersey & N.Y. Transit, 30 N.J. 345, 153 A.2d. 28 (1959).
The court said if no evidence is introduced to prove the infant's capacity then
the child was presumed incapable of contributory negligence. In Dillman v.
Mitchell, 13 N.J. 412, 99 A2d 809 (1953), the court in rebuking the statement
that the Illinois rule was the overwhelming weight of authority said that six
jurisdictions followed the Illinois rule compared to twenty-one that followed
the Massachusetts rule. Eckhardt v. Hanson, 196 Minn. 270, 264 N.W. 776
(1936), rejected the conclusive presumption of incapacity for children under
seven and held this was a jury question. See Annot., 77 A.L.R2d 917 (1961),
for a list of jurisdictions rejecting the Illinois rule.
46. 27 Am. JuR. Infants § 91 (1940); Terry, Negligence, 29 HARv. L. Rv.
40 (1915).
47. In Jorgensen v. Nudelman, 45 I1. App. 2d 350, 195 N.E.2d 422 (1963),
the absurdity of a double standard was pointed out. Imagine a suit between two
children under seven who had both been injured. The defendant filed a counter-
claim. They both could be guilty of negligence as defendants but neither of
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of a child's capacity to be contributorily negligent was debated
for many years. The most famous case arising in this debate was
Tyler v. Weed 8 where the majority applied the Massachusetts
rule. In 1965, however, Michigan did adopt the Illinois rule in
Baker v. Al0 9 by holding that a child under seven was conclu-
sively presumed to be incapable of contributory negligence. In
Queens Ins. Co. v. Hammond Michigan extended this doctrine
to apply to negligence and the intentional torts5l of children
under seven.
Similarly, Michigan has invoked application of the rule so as
to affect decisions involving the Motor Vehicle Guest Statute.
In Bur7mus v. Witbek 52 the court held that a five year old was
incapable of being a guest because he did not have the capacity
to enter into the guest relationship. The infant plaintiff was
allowed to recover by showing the ordinary negligence of the
defendant rather than gross and willful negligence.
The Illinois court has itself refused to extend the contributory
negligence conclusive presumption theory of children under
seven to intentional or non-negligent torts on the ground that
there is no capacity requirement in these areas.58 In South Caro-
lina and other jurisdictions following the Illinois rule, it could
be logically argued that by applying this contributory negligence
theory a child under seven cannot enter into any relationship" 4
or be guilty of any act that would require mental capacity.
48. 285 Mich. 460, 280 N.W. 827 (1938).
49. 374 Mich. 492, 132 N.W.2d 614 (1965).
50. 374 Mich. 655, 132 N.W.2d 792 (1965).
51. Huchting v. Engel, 17 Wis. 203, 84 Am. Dec. 741 (1863); 27 Am. JuR.
Infants § 90 (1940). The general rule is that infants are absolutely liable for
their torts.
52. 375 Mich. 253, 134 N.W2d 225 (1965).
53. Seaburg v. Williams, 16 Ill. App. 2d 295, 148 N.E2d 49 (1958). The
court held that a cause of action for a non-negligent tort could be maintained
against a six year old boy who set fire to a garage. However, on remand the
trial court charged the boy with negligently setting fire to the garage. The
appellate court reversed because negligence was not averred to in the pleadings
but stated that in a case properly presented a child under seven would be con-
clusively presumed to be incapable of negligent conduct. Seaburg v. Williams,
23 Ill. App. 2d 25, 161 N.E2d 576 (1959).
54. The South Carolina Guest Statute states that:
No person transported by an owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his
guest ... shall have a cause of action for damages against motor vehicle
or . . .owner or operator for injury, death or loss . . .unless such acci-
dent shall have been intentional . . . or caused by his heedlessness or his
reckless disregard of the rights of others. (Emphasis added.)
S.C. CoDE ANN. § 46-801 (1962). Query: would the South Carolina Supreme
Court follow Burhans v. Whitbeck, 375 Mich. 253, 134 N.W2d 255 (1965),
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IV. CONCLUSION
The purpose of the lesser standard for children is to allow for
their immaturity, indiscretion, inexperience and incapacity, but it
is not to excuse childish acts merely on the basis of the amount
of time they have or have not lived. Rather than rote application
of a simple chronological age test, it seems more logical to con-
sider the elements of intelligence, experience, maturity, capacity
and training where they may be pertinent.
It is unrealistic to say that a child seven years old absolutely
has no capacity to take care of himself. Recognition of some
dangers is so simple that even a very young child is able to under-
stand the hazards after the danger has been properly explained
to him. On the other hand, many dangers are so disguised that
reasonable men could not differ as to the child's incapacity to
understand and appreciate the existence of the danger. In the
latter situation the court might rule as a matter of law as to
the incapacity of the infant.
The Massachusetts rule is the modern trend, and adoption of
it serves to settle many confusing areas without relinquishing any
protection already afforded the child. Its application gains for
the law a needed flexibility which prevents inequitable results
from accruing against the slightly negligent defendant.
AnTHUR H. McQumN, Jn.
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